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Abstract 
Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Hans Morgenthau are listed among the founding fathers of political 
realism in Western culture. I will try to show that an Indian author and his book – namely Kautilya`s Arthashastra – offer as 
much insight and value as some of the best-known political writers. Although it seems aggressively ruthless and mean at times, 
Arthashastra accounts for a realist view on politics in ancient India. But as Heinrich Zimmer put it, ancient ideas had a strange 
modern touch to them. It is also the case of this Indian treaty and it will be my task to find its modern implications, starting with 
the theory of political circles (mandala), which is a genuine realist political model. 
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1. Arthashastra. A historical context 
In an article written for The New York Review of Books, Indian economist Amartya Sen reflects upon the 
dominance of Western culture over our perceptions and the tendency to explain other cultures by subjecting them to 
the West. The West is seen as “having exclusive access to the values that lie at the foundation of rationality and 
reasoning, science and evidence, liberty and tolerance, and of course rights and justice” (Sen, 2000). Therefore, non-
Western cultures must have different features, unrelated to the West. If only Bhagavad-Gita and Tantric texts elicit 
some interest India becomes mystic, religious, irrational, and exotic. The rest of Indian writings, including many in 
the field of mathematics, epistemology, natural science, linguistics, and economics remain largely unknown. As Sen 
puts it: “When identity is thus ‘defined by contrast’, divergence with the West becomes central.” There are many 
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Indian texts that match Western ones in substance and analysis, including economic science and political 
philosophy.  
Had it been known to the Western world previously, the old Indian treaty of Arthashastra should have been listed 
among notable classical texts of political philosophy. But it was discovered only in 1905 by indologist R. 
Shamashastri in a heap of palm-leaf manuscripts at the Oriental Research Institute in Mysore, south India (Allan, 
Wolseley Haig &Dodwell, 1934:38). Four years later, Shamashastri transliterates the ancient text from Grantha, a 
script widely used by Tamil speakers in southern India, into Sanskrit. Later, in 1915, he publishes the first English 
translation of Arthashastra. The treaty is ascribed to Kautilya (370-283 B.C.), chancellor to King Chandragupta, the 
mighty founder of the Mauryan dynasty. Known to the Greeks as Sandracotta, King Chandragupta gained control 
over a large part of India during the fourth century B.C, from Bengal in the east to Afghanistan in the west and the 
Narmada River in the south. It is thought that part of this success may be ascribed to his chancellor.  
Kautilya deserves a place among other remarcable figures in the history of political thought, such as Thomas 
Hobbes, Niccolò Machiavelli, Confucius or the Chinese Legalists. Similar to the Legalists, who outlined the 
ideological principles of the first Chinese dynasty, the Qin (221-207 B.C.), Kautilya stresses the importance of state 
power and the obedience that must be shown to power. He shares with Hobbes a pessimistic view about human 
nature and, like Machiavelli, is interested in educating the perfect statesman, someone who is powerful enough to 
keep and expand his authority. Yet unlike the works of Machiavelli or Confucius, Arthashastra does not tackle 
moral issues. Morality – the subject of another series of Indian treaties, the Dharmashastras (treaties about the laws 
of moral actions) – is personal. 
Another indologist, Heinrich Zimmer, describes Arthashastra as the manual (shastra) dealing with the science of 
wealth (artha) (Zimmer, 1997: 33). Its 15 books cover a broad array of issues, from public administration and 
economy to foreign relations. Roger Boesche names Kautilya “the first great political realist” (Boesche, 2002), 
while Max Weber ironically describes Il Principe as “harmless” when compared to the Indian treaty where mean 
calculation becomes guideline for political actions. For instance, when talking about how important it is for a ruler 
to grant his subjects a decent life, it is not people`s well-being he has in mind, but kingdom prosperity. Content 
people have no reason to riot and everyone knows that riots can devastate a kingdom and ruin a king`s authority. 
Thus, an astute ruler will take care of his people while expanding power. It is known that in ancient India, a monarch 
could not count on anyone but the army and various professional spies (Zimmer, 1997: 80) to protect him, for sacred 
power belonged to the Brahmins (Kautilya pertained to this caste). Unlike Chinese emperors, Indian kings held no 
divine warrant, but depended on Sri-Laksmi`s moods, the goddess of luck. As Zimmer said, it is from a sense of 
frailty that the skeptical, fatalistic and realistic political philosophy may have sprung from (Zimmer, 1997: 74). That 
is why strategic thinking was a must for Indian rulers.  
Therefore the training of a future king implies discipline and self-control. “Self-control, which is the basis of 
knowledge and discipline, is acquired by giving up lust, anger, greed, conceit, arrogance, and foolhardiness. […] A 
king who has no self-control and gives himself up to excessive indulgence in pleasures will soon perish, even if he is 
the ruler of all four corners of the world.” (1.6.4) (Kautilya, 1992: 144). If a king is urged to master his senses, to 
cultivate the intellect, to keep his eyes open through spies, to improve his learning, to promote the welfare of his 
people and to treat them justly, it is only because this will enable him to maintain rule and power for a long time. 
This advice is not given out of moral responsibility towards humans in general. It is practical advice, not ethical 
norms of conduct. People are loyal to a just king. If the king happens to be unjust, people will go over to the enemy 
and this way he loses his kingdom.  
Kautilya helped Chandragupta unite the empire by defeating the corrupt Nanda kings. But an overthrown dynasty 
will seek revenge. Therefore, the entire Nanda family was assassinated. Yet there is a limit to political 
assassinations. When new territory is conquered from an enemy only the ruler has to be killed, not the people, 
because they can be turned into soldiers. Treaties with neighboring countries should be respected as long as this is 
convenient. “When the benefits accruing to kings under a treaty, irrespective as their status as the weaker, equal or 
stronger king, is fair to each one, peace by agreement shall be the preferred course; if the benefits are to be 
distributed unfairly, war is preferable.” (7.8.34) (Kautilya, 1992: 541). As Boesche considers, in Arthashastra 
diplomacy is a very subtle act of war.  
131 Cristiana Budac /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  183 ( 2015 )  129 – 134 
2. Mandala or the theory of political circles 
Indians ascribe pictorial characteristics to the universe. A mandala (Sanskrit for “circle”) projects the world 
geometrically, representing the universe in its essential form. The perpetual drama of cosmic disintegration and 
reintegration is expressed through these instruments of meditation. Kautilya uses the shape of a mandala to develop 
a political geometry that accounts for various political realities. In the seventh book of Arthashastra he describes 
international relations as a mandala system. Mandala or the theory of the political circles of neighbors is an abstract 
model used to describe foreign relations between various Indian states at war with each other. Heinrich Zimmer uses 
it to explain events in European history such as power configurations during World War II. This model implies a 
series of concentric rings or circles which stand for the enemies and allies of a given king. The king and his kingdom 
are located in the middle of the system. The first ring of states that surround him is made of enemies (neighbors, 
being closer, can attack easier). Beyond the first circle of enemies is the circle of political allies (thus confirming the 
principle that the enemy of my enemy is my friend). A third circle surrounds the second circle and makes for 
another circle of enemies etc. Outside this mandala remains only a king powerful enough to be neutral or various 
tribes presenting less danger than a state. A shrewd king knows how to use both his geographical positions and that 
of his allies and enemies successfully. He should never forget that his enemies might seek similar ends.  
The whole theory is based upon the belief in a competitive and conflictive human nature. If humans are 
competitive, so are their political actions. War and peace are understood in terms of profit. International affairs take 
place on a battlefield where someone else’s ascension to power can be impeded through warfare. Kautilya, like 
Machiavelli later, thinks that a true leader must always look for ways to concentrate more power into his own hands. 
In order to do that he must give free course to his proclivities, not all of them appealing by moral standards. They 
are similar to what Machiavelli called virtú, that is, a “flexible disposition” of someone capable to change his mind 
and conduct when circumstances require it. To the Florentine thinker virtú is connected to power.  Only when a 
prince grasps the importance of acquiring virtú will he know how to master politics. But even Machiavelli admits 
that there are two kinds of morality, Christian and pagan and, as Isaiah Berlin puts it, “the pagan world that 
Machiavelli prefers is built on recognition of the need for systematic guile and force by rulers, and he seems to think 
it natural and not at all exceptional or morally agonizing that they should employ these weapons wherever they are 
needed.” (Berlin, 1971). The ethics of a glorified ancient Rome will create a new republic of brave and fearless men 
willing to do whatever it takes to defend it. Christian values do not teach you what to do when confronted with 
corrupt or bullying rulers; they sometimes do not work for politics either. For Machiavelli, a harsh political reality 
requires an unusual moral code. Kautilya does not talk morality at all. To him, the world is a dangerous place where 
the most intelligent win the upper hand.  
In International Relations realism shapes a conflict-based view of the international scene where actors – that is, 
states – are struggling to gain more power and security. By following one’s own goals there is little room left for the 
others. This is a reason why realism is often described as unethical. As Thucydides wrote in his History of the 
Peloponnesian War, an independent state can survive only when it has enough power. Security and power are 
interrelated. One can only maintain security by gaining more power to keep the enemies at bay. The Greek historian 
sees the cause of the Peloponnesian War in an unstable distribution of power between Athens and Sparta. Yet, 
according to Korab-Karpowicz (Korab-Karpowicz, 2013), Thucydides also describes two different worldviews in 
the “Melian Dialogue”: the realist one (epitomized by the rational, overconfident Athenians who eventually lost the 
27 year Peloponnesian wars), and the idealist one (namely the proud and pious Melians). Relying on power alone 
does not guarantee long-lasting success. Idealism alone does not help much either (the Melians also lost the war). It 
would be the task of Hans Morgenthau and other 20th century realist political thinkers to find a balance between 
state interests and ethical norms. In this respect, Kautilya is closer to Machiavelli than to Thucydides.  
3. The law of the fish 
“The progress of this world depends on the maintenance of order and the [proper functioning of] government.” 
(1.4.4) (Kautilya, 1992: 108), writes Kautilya in Book 1 of Arthashastra. Maintaining order is the main task for a 
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good king because this is how he can “preserve what he already has, acquire new possessions, augment his wealth 
and power, and share the benefits of improvement with those worthy of such gifts.”(1.4.3) (Kautilya, 1992:108).  
The metaphor of “the law of the fish” depicts the world in the absence of such a king capable of upholding law 
and order. It is actually the law of the jungle the ancient chancellor refers to. We all live in a big pond where the big 
fish eat the little ones and must, in turn, be aware of the fisherman. As we have already seen the welfare of people is 
important for expanding power, therefore a king must know how to use punishment wisely against those who upset 
the social and political order. An unjust ruler will terrorize his subjects and ignite fury by handing to many 
punishments. A weak king will be incapable of using punishment, and tempts chaos.  
4. Ancient Indian political theory today 
Heinrich Zimmer believed that archaic teachings had a strange, modern touch to them. He used the mandala to 
explain the way in which England struggled to maintain a balance of power in Europe for more than 200 years 
seeking useful alliances with other countries. It allied itself with Holland, Portugal and Denmark against France at 
the beginning of the 18th century when Louis XIV proclaimed his own nephew king of Spain and threatened 
European monarchies. Later, when France made an alliance with Austria, Sweden and Saxony against Prussia, 
England supported Frederic the Great. Against Napoleon it allied itself with Portugal, Spain, Russia, Austria, Prussia 
and Holland (with the last three at Waterloo). But in the middle of the 19th century, England partnered with France 
against Russia in the Crimean War. At the begining of the 20th century it endorsed Japan against Russia, and allied 
itself with Russia against Germany and Austria during the First World War.  
The realist theory of International Relations underlines the competitive, conflictual side of international actors 
indeed. States are looking to maintain security and to gain more power even if this means war. England`s attempt to 
keep a power balance illustrates this realism. Soon after World War I, idealists came with the idea of an 
international system of law and international organizations that would be able to prevent another major conflict. 
Assuming conflict to be residing in social and political configurations, thus not inherent to human nature, the 
idealists created the League of Nations. Yet it did not prevent the outburst of World War II. Optimism rapidly 
shifted back towards realism and in the late 70s, as the Cold War was coming near an end, there could be seen a 
revival of idealist thinking stressing the importance of international organizations and multinational corporations 
(Korab-Karpowicz, 2013). The European Union is also an idealistic project based on willingness of states to 
cooperate with each other in order to ensure European peace. Even if war seems improbable, it does not mean that 
every kind of conflict is resolved. There are still many European and national issues to be sorted out. And since the 
last financial crisis and the rise of nationalism it seems even harder to maintain an optimistic view in Europe.  
Mandala outlines relationships of interested friendship and vile rivalry. Indian diplomacy teaches different 
techniques of approaching an enemy. Here is a list of techniques compiled by Heinrich Zimmer as one can find it in 
many Indian writings ( Arthashastra does not list them as such but they can be identified in Kautilya`s teachings 
easily): 
x Saman (to negociate, to reconcile peacefully) 
x Dada (punishment, violence, restriction) 
x Dana (gift, bribe) 
x Bheda (to disunite, the Latin divide et impera) 
x Maya (to deceive, to create an illusion) 
x Upeksa (to ignore, to pretend not to see something) 
x Indrajala (Indra’s net, deceiving by spreading false information)  
Some modern implications of these diplomatic techniques can be sorted out. Saman or peaceful reconciliation is 
an instrument deployed by the E.U. whenever a state of conflict occurs. Such idealism works only among a given 
number of states that subscribe to the same norms of conduct. It does not work when dealing with countries like 
Russia that has a totally different view on international affairs. If today most European countries accept the idealistic 
view in international relations, Russia remains realist, as Russian writer Vladimir Sorokin puts it in an interview for 
Der Spiegel. Referring to his country as “a fortress” where Orthodox churches, autocracy and national traditions 
form “a new national ideology”, Sorokin deplores the self-imposed isolation of Russia. Vladimir Putin likes to quote 
Czar Alexander III who strongly believed that his empire has only two allies, the army and the navy. This is a 
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defense strategy that sees Russia surrounded by enemies, underlines Sorokin. By enemies Russian authorities refer 
mainly to the United States of America. Some Russian officials use the old Soviet rhetoric, as those army generals 
do when bragging on TV channels that “Russian missiles are ahead of the latest American models by three five-year 
plans”. It is this bellicose mentality of the Soviet era Sorokin calls a huge step backward. But president Putin seems 
to mourn the lost world in a speech held on March 18 2014, the day Crimea was taken over by Russia: “Like a 
mirror, the situation in Ukraine reflects what is going on and what has been happening in the world over the past 
several decades. After the dissolution of bipolarity on the planet, we no longer have stability. Key international 
institutions are not getting any stronger; on the contrary, in many cases, they are sadly degrading. Our western 
partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided by international law in their practical policies, 
but by the rule of the gun. They have come to believe in their exclusivity and exceptionalism, that they can decide 
the destinies of the world, that only they can ever be right. They act as they please: here and there, they use force 
against sovereign states, building coalitions based on the principle ‘If you are not with us, you are against us.’ To 
make this aggression look legitimate, they force the necessary resolutions from international organizations, and if 
for some reason this does not work, they simply ignore the UN Security Council and the UN overall.” Ironically, the 
same can be said about Russia.  
Conflict and war, if needed, are instruments to acquire and maintain power or political influence. Punishment and 
violence (dada) are deployed throughout Crimea as Russian troops stormed over Ukrainian military bases in March 
2014. A gas debt of almost 2 billion dollars is used by Russia to put pressure on a feeble Ukrainian economy.  On 
the other hand, U.S and E.U hand out mild sanctions against some of the top influential Russian oligarchs. “Putin’s 
Russia had spoken of Ukraine disdainfully—it was a backwater, dull and provincial. Suddenly, Ukraine became 
incredibly fashionable and modern, while enormous Russia seemed hopelessly backward, cumbersome, and 
provincial”, writes Sorokin in an essay for The New York Review of Books called “Russia is Pregnant with Ukraine”. 
Playing the “capricious, unpredictable Queen of Spades”, as Sorokin labels him, Putin prepares the invasion of 
Ukraine, a procedure “performed by separatists, saboteurs, ‘soldiers of fortune,’ adventurists, and provocateurs.” 
But he insists on calling it it a democratic cry of the people in Crimea: “the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol 
turned to Russia for help in defending their rights and lives, in preventing the events that were unfolding and are still 
underway in Kiev, Donetsk, Kharkov and other Ukrainian cities. Naturally, we could not leave this plea unheeded; 
we could not abandon Crimea and its residents in distress.” Russia had to intrude in order to protect Russians living 
there. There are large numbers of ethnic Russians living also in Kazakhstan, Trans-Dniester, Latvia, Estonia, 
Belarus (although, except for Northern Kazakhstan, they do not form the majority). Should these countries be afraid 
of a Russian invasion too? Latvia and Estonia are E.U. members, so there is little danger there. The E.U. tried to win 
some of these republics over (Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Ukraine), but Belarus and Armenia 
joined the Russian customs union instead. And Moscow does not use soft methods when it comes to protecting its 
own interests in the region: cutting gas supplies to Ukraine in winter, banning imports from Ukrainian firms, 
banning Moldavian wine imports (a key export sector for Moldova), backing separatists in Trans-Dniester, and now 
the take-over of Crimea. In the middle of the speech Putin became straightforward: “They are constantly trying to 
sweep us into a corner because we have an independent position, because we maintain it and because we call things 
like they are and do not engage in hypocrisy. But there is a limit to everything. And with Ukraine, our western 
partners have crossed the line, playing the bear and acting irresponsibly and unprofessionally. After all, they were 
fully aware that there are millions of Russians living in Ukraine and in Crimea. They must have really lacked 
political instinct and common sense not to foresee all the consequences of their actions. Russia found itself in a 
position it could not retreat from. If you compress the spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard. You must 
always remember this.” If it is pushed to the limit, Russia will respond as it sees fit. After remembering historical 
events that bond his country to Ukraine, after alluding to friendship and human rights, after so much concern for the 
96 percent who voted in favor of reuniting with Russia, the president comes to a very simple, realistic truth: leave us 
to do as we please, or be prepared for the consequences.   
European diplomats think that Kremlin`s goal after the annexation of Crimea is to „destabilize Ukraine and to 
sabotage its pro-western government.”(Harding, 2014). This is the very old technique of divide et impera (bheda). 
As for maya and Indrajala, both were used by president Putin to justify the annexation of Crimea and to convince 
the Russian majority in the peninsula that a better future awaits them as members of the Federation. Many residents 
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of Crimea were led to believe that terrorists took over Kiev and that the legitimate president, Yanukovych, was 
forced to leave. The Russians were also manipulated by television. It was a lot of talk about Ukrainian liberal-
fascists and America using Ukrainian liberal-fascists to occupy Ukraine. Putin`s speech referred to a “fifth column” 
and “national traitors”. “Those who stood behind the latest events in Ukraine had a different agenda: they were 
preparing yet another government takeover; they wanted to seize power and would stop short of nothing. They 
resorted to terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites executed this coup. They 
continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this day” says Putin in his address.  
It is not clear if Russia will continue with its expansionism. Acquiring new territories is a costly business 
nowadays and president Putin seems to know it: “I also want to address the people of Ukraine. (…) I want you to 
hear me, my dear friends. Do not believe those who want you to fear Russia, shouting that other regions will follow 
Crimea. We do not want to divide Ukraine; we do not need that.” Russia is trying to protect itself with a circle of 
countries that form a barrier along its borders and facilitate access to strategic zones (such as Crimea to the Black 
Sea). NATO is a major concern: “Let me note too that we have already heard declarations from Kiev about Ukraine 
soon joining NATO. What would this have meant for Crimea and Sevastopol in the future? It would have meant that 
NATO’s navy would be right there in this city of Russia’s military glory, and this would create not an illusory but a 
perfectly real threat to the whole of southern Russia.” Russia does not want the military alliance in its “backyard” so 
it uses neighboring countries or regions in order to gain and secure more power (the harbor of Sevastopol is a key 
factor in shipping weapons – a large sector of Russian industry – to Middle East, especially Syria). Some political 
analysts say it is not all about NATO getting close, but about the Europeanization of Ukraine: “The current crisis is 
not about Ukraine joining NATO, a move for which there is no great public demand. Rather it is about the 
possibility that Ukraine would reject integration into the Eurasian Union, which is key to Putin’s fantasies of 
rebuilding a Russian Empire. He could not accept the possibility of a successful, Europeanized Ukraine, prosperous 
and governed by the rule of law, where a ‘Ukraine virus’ might be bred that would ultimately ‘infect’ 
Russia.”(Braun, 2014) 
Russia is building a mandala of power by bribing, punishing, and deceiving. It holds on to a realist political 
model while the E.U. offers liberal, diplomatic counterstrikes of peaceful negotiation. Even an array of sanctions 
imposed by the EU and US are targeting only some key Russian sectors (banks, EU-Russia military deals, but not 
gas industry). In an article written for World Affairs Journal , professor Aurel Braun indicated that “soft power alone 
has not deterred Russia, and neither have the ‘soft’ sanctions it has imposed. This is why the West has to move to 
sanctions that will be a form of hard power, even though they will not be cost free.” 
Engaging in an open conflict with Moscow will definitely not put an end to turmoil. However, there seems to be 
no solution to Thucydides’ old dilemma – namely the irreconcilable dispute between liberal, idealist political views 
and the realist ones. 
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